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Starting with the aesthetics of the book itself (see Katharina Wilken’s article on text-related 
practices or text acts contained in it, on pp. 155-164), it presents itself as quite heavy, with thin 
and sharp pages. One has to be careful not to cut open ones fingertips. But the choice of paper 
is worth this risk of a slightly painful sensation (or nociception, as I now have learned it is called 
– see Koch, p. 28). Colorful images decorate the articles, elegantly complementing their 
contents with their own, non-verbal information. Still, they also illustrate the fact that the 
knowledge I might gain from perceiving the images, from seeing and understanding them, is 
pre-formed by the knowledge I have gained before – by reading the captions, for instance, 
which are more detailed than usual, and by other information. The sheer beauty of the sky 
lanterns of the cover image – whether I somewhere learned to see them as beautiful, or whether 
I was born with some cognitive predispositions forcing me to find them appealing – is now 
clouded by my knowledge of the apes caused to die by such sky lanterns in Krefeld, Germany, 
just some days ago. This knowledge alters my perception and the dramaturgical use of this 
image as a device for capturing attention – which brings us right to central points this volume 
is about to make. Knowledge, perception, use of devices, attention – all of these concepts are 
nexuses as well as fields of contention between humanities, natural/life sciences, and 
psychology.  
Three beautiful images selected by Brigitte Luchesi to illustrate her article on Cult Images, pp. 
210, 212 & 217, show human people in the lost profile, seen from the left, applying different 
ritual substances with their right hand to deities in different forms of images: once as a temple 
relief, once as a poster and once in a domestic shrine. Aesthetically, the similarity of the view’s 
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angle enables the viewer’s gaze to parallel the worshipper’s gaze, envisaging the respective 
deity. Due to personal communication with the author before reading this article, I know that 
this aesthetic decision is foremost due to the legal difficulty in publishing faces of private 
persons. Nevertheless, it is still a powerful act of knowledge formation (cf. the article of Grieser 
and Borelli, pp. 33-46 of this volume). 
In her foreword, Birgit Meyer praises the volume for fulfilling several important tasks, which I 
will take as the standards against which I will judge the contributions. I therefore ask: 
A) Do the entries of this handbook provide “a systematic account on the aesthetics of religion 
as a new, interdisciplinary, and international study field” (p. xvi)? 
B) Are emic (native or indigenous) terms and distinctions, regarding sensation and perception, 
taken into account (ibid. f.)? Are the theoretical concepts grounded in “carefully crafted 
case studies” (p. xvii)? 
C) Are these “transcended” by well-informed, up-to date and non-reductive connective 
theories, integrating current “insights of medical psychology” and the “cognitive study of 
religion” (ibid.) with cultural approaches? Is this integration performed carefully, 
sceptically and critically? Is the mind-body dualism they strive to overcome really 
deconstructed and replaced instead of merely being reversed or obscured by “a facile lip-
service paid to embodiment and the like” (p. xvi.)?  
D) Does the volume as a whole provide us with a “specialized vocabulary” (introduction, p. 
2) for doing aesthetic studies of religion?  
E) How can I apply these terms and methods in my PhD Project?1 
F) In particular, which insights into the study of religious emotions can I draw from this read? 
G) Does the volume move readers “out of their carefully guarded comfort zones” and break 
“new ground for scholarship” (p. xvii)? 
To be sure, the last demand is a bit unfair, for such promises are a conventional part of academic 
rhetoric (for such “Aesthetics of Science and Politics, cf. Binder, p. 265 of this volume) and not 
necessarily expected to be fulfilled – not unlike the “intriguing”, “fascinating” and “awe-struck” 
emotions often proclaimed after hearing a talk, but not necessarily expected to be really felt. 
But still, in their introduction, Anne Koch and Katharina Wilkens even “warn” us how 
                                                          
1 I am a PhD student using what I regard as an aesthetic approach to religion in my study of a current, central 
Himalayan goddess. Thus, I will also ask about how I might apply these terms and methods in my PhD Project, 
and to what extent I can use this volume as a “handbook” or manual (E). Moreover, both my research and my 
long interest in conferences and publications on the aesthetics of religion have guided me in regarding emotions 
and their aesthetic stimulation and regulation, which I call dramaturgy, as a central aspect within these fields (F). 
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connecting cognitive and cultural approaches “might change the reader’s perspective of things” 
(p. 1). Thus, a short note about the fulfilled or unfulfilled promise of a “wow“ (cf. Hermann & 
Lokshina, pp. 193 ff..), evoked by this volume, might be justified. For the editors see it as a 
“duty of responsible scholarship to address power relations” (p.8), I will also check the chapters 
for 
H) political implications. 
 
A) A systematic account of the Aesthetics of Religion? 
The Aesthetics of Religion, as represented by the Handbook, aims at analysing “the way in 
which religion constructs, stimulates, disciplines, inhibits, etc. the senses” (Johnston, p. 21). 
Therefore, it asks “how images, sounds, gestures, material culture, movements, and the 
expansion or reduction of sensory stimuli socialize, channel, and form religious identities, 
experiences, and knowledge cultures, and create social effervescence and social bonds” (Wilke, 
p. 107). Internally, the Handbook is organized in four parts on the Approach (I), Analytical 
categories (II), Strategies of Aesthetic formation (III) and Aestheticscapes (IV). These parts are 
rather vaguely defined; most of the chapters could as well have been put in another of these 
sections, which is, to be fair, rather the norm in edited Volumes. Still, it makes it harder to use 
this book as a “handbook”; a glossary with short definitions of the most important critical terms 
would be helpful for more ready reference. Concepts like embodied cognition or extended mind, 
which are new to me – by name, not exactly by their ideas – are scattered throughout the articles. 
There is deliberately no “chapter on each of the ‘five senses’” (p. 7), which is good for 
deconstructing this notion, but other superordinate categories might have been found. In a such 
a definite and comprehensive systematic account on religion and the senses, chapters, for 
instance, on South Asian rasa theory and references to Susanne Langer’s work on Feeling and 
Form might have been a valuable addition. 
B) Grounded in Emic terms and Case Studies? 
“Religious traditions have developed an impressive variety of theories on sensual 
perception, the materiality of the world and the functioning of the human body”  
(p. 9). 
Accordingly, the volume takes manifold native terms on perception and sensation into account. 
Luchesi’s classification of Hindu cult images are directly derived from religious practice (pp. 
208-211). Likewise, Guggenmos (p. 223) differentiates three sorts of smells according to their 
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occurrence and description in Chinese Buddhist hagiographies. The reader finds short 
summaries of Aztec concepts of consciousness (p. 233), South Asian genres of music and 
related cosmologies (p. 113), or conflict hierarchies and devaluations of specific senses in the 
Christian Reformation and Counter-reformation (Yelle, pp. 245-250).  
Part IV on Aestheticscapes more explicitly presents ethnographic and historical examples, but 
many of the other entries also keep close to the authors’ research fields. Abstract and (allegedly) 
universal concepts are illustrated with well selected examples, for instance, the Ignatian 
exercises as an example for the concrete practice of Imagination (Traut & Wahl, pp. 61-72), 
making intentional use of different senses successively. While aestheticscapes is a term I came 
across several times lately, I find it aesthetically less appealing than sensescapes (see Mohr, pp. 
137 ff.), which – as far as I understood – does not differ substantially regarding the term’s 
denotation or connotations. 
C) Integration  
As far as I can tell, being not acquainted with the current debates and states of the art in 
Neuropsychology, Physiology, and Cognitive Sciences, the authors draw on these disciplines 
in an impressively well-informed and careful way. The chapter on Absorbtion, for instance, 
offers a solid comparative study, based on intense fieldwork and emic views as well as on 
neuropsychological methods and concepts (p. 87 ff.). In this extensive study, Luhrmann 
“compared the answers people gave to the absorption scale [Tellegen & Atkinson 1974] to the 
answers they gave to the questions […] about their spiritual experience”. The correlations2 she 
thus detected among Pentecostal Christians, who engage in practices like glossolalia, fitted well 
to her earlier ethnographic study on contemporary English Occultists.  
Most of the contributers are very aware of the dangers emerging when “scientific results are 
presented as ahistorical objective facts based on standardized, quantitative instrumental 
practices” (Borelli&Grieser, p. 38). Borelli and Grieser, for example, work on how such facts 
are presented and thereby not only illustrated, but molded by the use of images which partly 
stem from religious history. This raises new, and even surprising, doubts about the notion of 
scientific knowledge as independent from (religiously preformed) habits of perceiving and 
world making. Thus successfully dissolving the “modern opposition between objective, rational 
science and subjective, intuitive religion”, they aim to not only go beyond a dualism, but even 
                                                          
2 “Those who [sic!] with high absorption scores were much more likely to report that they experienced God as if 
God really is a person – someone they could talk to easily, who talked back, with whom one could laugh, at 
whom one could get angry” (p. 93). 
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a meta-dualism of dualisms, namely the “dichotonomy of opposition or complementarity” 
(ibid.). Another dualism successfully deconstructed is the “secular/religious binary” (Binder, p. 
265). Binder demonstrates how the notion that “the body, the senses, figuration, and material 
media are intrinsic to processes of intellectual reasoning and knowledge” (ibid.) can be applied 
– and verified – in an ethnographic study, without using methods from life sciences. 
Understanding Imagination as a cognitive ability, of which religious rituals and narrations make 
use to support “suspension of disbelief” and “counterfactual thinking” (p. 64), Traut and Wahl 
make use of concepts from cognitive science. Still, they do not uncritically apply them. 
Departing from the understanding of Johannsen and Kirsch (pp. 143-153), they decide to use 
the term in a sense of situative “mode-switching instead of […] a non-stop active cultural and 
epistemological imagination as in prediction theory of mind” (64). 
Some of the new insights of “embodied, embedded, enactive, extended, and affective (4EA) 
cognitive science” (Hermann & Lokshina, p. 196) seem to me, as an outsider, quite banal. It 
might be useful for studying religious imaginations and imagined sensescapes to know that 
“embodied simulation theories suggest that language activates a mental simulation of the 
verbalized perceptions” (Traut & Wahl, p. 67) – but, maybe, it does not come in too handy in 
any empirical research. To apply such an insight – however this might be done – requires 
knowledge about the current discourses within these scientific fields and the extent to which a 
notion usually taken for granted is actually proven or debated. Without this knowledge, it is 
hard to judge – and, having read the Handbook, it still is – whether the notion of knowledge 
being embodied is as uncontroversial as it sounds, or else, what the Aztecs’ “knowledge stored 
in their bodies and minds” (Laack, p. 238) is supposed to mean.  
My own recent and previous engagement with the theory of metaphor by Johnson & Lakoff 
(1980)  makes me suspect that there is much more to it. This work is referred to as the source 
for embodied cognition theory (Borelli & Grieser, p. 37; Laack, p. 230), whereas I have so far 
read it less as a neurological than philosophical and linguistic study of terms for abstract notions 
based on concepts of bodily experience, like the spatial directions, physical properties, or body 
parts.3 In general, “the study of figurative language and narrative forms are central to aesthetics 
of religion research” (Kreinath, p. 50). Usually, this means staying in the realms of literature 
studies and philosophy, but it might also point to the physiological basics of cognition studied 
                                                          
3 Typischerweise konzeptualisieren alltagssprachliche Metaphern „das Nichtphysische in Begriffen des 
Physischen […], das unscharf Konturierte in Begriffen des schärfer Konturierten“ (Johnson, Mark; Lakoff, 
George (engl. Orig. 1980): Leben in Metaphern. Heidelberg: Carl-Auer-Systeme, 1998, S. 72; vgl. auch S. 
28ff.). 
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by Johnson & Lakoff. Such a cognitive metaphorology of religion4 would be a good companion 
to an aesthetics of religion – at least, if I believe with Anne Koch that such a study “must 
recognize that aesthetic taste, aesthetic judgement, and epistemic knowledge are body-based 
because they involve basic cognitive, semiotic, and semantic categories that are shaped during 
developmental acquisition in a practical-sensorial environment” (Koch, p. 27). By opening up 
in such a way for life science approaches and terms, scholars of religion can learn not to “neglect 
sensorial loops […] like pain, sexual stimulus, temperature, humidity” (introduction, p. 7) and 
others.  
Should we thus aim at “overcoming the focus on social theories” (Introduction, p. 2) while 
studying religion? This is where I – and several of the authors in this volume – do not agree. 
As Peter Bräunlein warns, a cognitivist notion of (religious) humans as “intelligent apes that 
are highly emotional, easily spooked” (Bräunlein, p. 2745) tends towards “overgeneralization 
and reductive simplification” (p. 275). Conversely, other authors explicitly aim to “reduce” the 
manifold “tasks” of cognition, action, emotion and imagination to “one unifying principle: a 
universal prediction-error minimization mechanism […], i.e., the constant attempt to maximize 
predictive efficacy” (Johannson & Kirsch, p. 145). This reduction (usually a pejorative term in 
the Humanities) is here even hailed as “the strength and beauty of the PP framework” (ibid.). 
This framework, abbreviated for “Predictive Processing” (see pp. 144 & 77), is only one of a 
dizzying number of terms and concepts introduced in the volume. 
D) Vocabulary  
Especially the chapters about Imagination (Traut & Wahl, pp. 61-72), Sensory Strategies 
(Mohr, pp. 129-142) and Epistemology (Koch, pp. 23-32) provide the reader with an 
overwhelming array of analytical terms, distinctions and definitions.  
 A distinction between “perception (Ger. Wahrnehmung) and sensation (Ger. Empfindung)” 
(Koch & Wilkens, p. 9, italics i.o.) is not consequentially drawn within the articles. Perhaps 
such a distinction between physical and cognitive processes, between abilities given by 
nature or by nurture, would not fit with the intention of going beyond the universalist vs. 
                                                          
4 An aesthetics of knowledge, for instance, engages with metaphors like “bringing light into darkness” (Borelli & 
Grieser, p. 37) – so it might gain a lot from some reference to Blumenbergs extensive study of this 
aesthetic/visual metaphor throughout the history of philosophy (Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie, 1960). 
5 This is a quote from Geerts, Armin (2013): Origins of Religion, Cognition and Culture, p. 19. 
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constructivist schism that tears apart academic approaches on aesthetics, religion, or 
emotion.6 
 Absorption is “inner sense cultivation” (Luhrmann, p. 85), the “capacity to focus in on the 
mind’s object – what humans imagine or see around them – and to allow that focus to 
increase while diminishing one’s attention to myriad everyday distractions that accompany 
the management of normal life” (p. 92). Here, the central point is that this capacity demands 
talent and/or training (p. 93). 
 Cross modal perception/ Intermodality, the cognitive “binding” or “congruence” (p.25) of 
different senses, has previously often been referred to as synaesthesia. Because this term 
risks confusion of cultural uses and literary tropes with the psychological syndromes,7 a 
more technical name for this basic condition of sensation might be useful.  
 The already intermodal sensations about the world and the body (extero/interoception, pp. 
28, 133) afford 2nd and 3rd order concepts and cognitions, namely, body scheme (p. 28) and 
body knowledge (p. 29). 
 Habituation is a process constitutive for learning, socialization, and acculturation. In 
religion, habituation is effected by intentional or implicit “strategies proved by long periods 
of trial and error: how to select and design ‘good locations’ for ritual or meditation, how to 
imagine gods and spirits, and how to transgress the borders of everyday aesthetics by 
religious means” (Mohr, p. 130).  
 Imagination is defined by Traut and Wahl (pp. 61ff.) in a way specific to the study of 
religion: it is “the human mind’s faculty that enables us to decouple from present reality” 
(p. 63). Imagination enables the emergence of “virtual realities” (p. 66), which imitates 
perception and tends to manifest itself in non-virtual, perceptible ways: “it is narrated, 
written down, acted out in theatrical ways and materialized in the form of pictures, objects, 
or whole aesthetic panoramas” (62). They distinguish “sensual”, “performative-bodily” 
and “linguistic” modes of imagination (p.67f.), and, furthermore, introduce “styles” and 
“technologies” of imagination (ibid.). 
Terms like imagination and body knowledge are not only elaborated on in respective chapters, 
but picked up throughout the volume (for instance by Pabst von Ohain, p. 253). 
  
                                                          
6 An overview on Cultural Relativist, Life Sciences and integrative approaches on emotion is given by Plamper, 
Jan (2015; Ger. orig. 2012): The History of Emotion. An Introduction. Oxford: University Press. 
7 Cf. https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/files/12435588/Defining_synaesthesia.pdf  
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E) How to write a PhD with an Aesthetics of Religion approach 
As I am writing about the aesthetic and emotional involvement of non-human beings in rituals, 
I started my reading with the chapter on Aesthetics of Spirits (Bräunlein, pp. 273-282) and, 
indeed, was rewarded by a thorough review of recent ethnographic studies which are useful to 
know. Imagination emerged from my reading as a key term to deal with otherworldly beings in 
an agnostic fashion. Ritual (Sørensen, pp. 73-84), on the other hand, is here defined in a 
cognitivist way, which I do not completely agree with. Still, I benefit from knowing and dealing 
with this approach: How applicable – and politically correct – is an “ethological definition of 
ritualization”, focusing on “features such as stipulation, repetition, iteration, stereotypy, goal 
demonition, extreme focus on detail, and anxiety about purity” (p. 77)?  My observations fit 
well to most of these features, but still, they seem to me too reductionist to apply them in 
fieldwork, as they strip rituals of their complex and often ambiguous local interpretations. 
Aniconicity and Aniconism (Actor, pp. 97-106) are helpful terms for conceptualizing the 
continuity between “embodiments” and “symbols/icons” of divine beings. The Hindu goddess 
I do my research on can, for instance, take several bodies or forms (svarūp) simultaneously: as 
a niśān, a bamboo “token” or “symbol”, she is carried around and “danced” (nacānā) by human 
carriers a Goddess, while she is herself “dancing” the bodies of possessed persons. 
I work with extensive film material and use editing and montage as a method – thus, I do not 
only analyse how “sensescapes and sensory displays” are “constructed” (Mohr, p. 137) in 
rituals, but I also (re-)construct sensory displays of rituals myself. Engaged in a second-order 
display, as a second-order dramaturg of the ritual, my “own practices of filmmaking also 
become the subject of reflection. How to represent religion and capture the ‘wow’ without 
ourselves producing a ‘religious’ film?” (Hermann and Lokshina, p. 195). 
Although the Volume is no recipe on how to write my PhD, the chapters on Imagination and 
Sensory Strategies alone provided me with enough terms and classifications to fill many pages 
of the analysis of my film material. Furthermore, this Volume has massively enriched my 
analytical toolset concerning religious emotionality and dramaturgy. As I focus my research on 
emotional aspects of the Goddess Naiṇī in her interaction with (and imagination by) her human 
kin, I am most thankful for this. 
F) Affect and Emotion – the “prediscoursive” 
What is an “atmosphere of gravity”, built up and used to increase sincerity/seriousness of 
motivation (pp. 65-66)? Do rituals build up a “virtual reality”, characterized by “emotional 
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tangibility” (whatever that means) and “emotionally labelled sensory experience” (p. 66)? Do 
religious techniques, devices and designs engage universal psychophysiological dispositions, 
for instance “making use of bodily resistance toward dead and stinking objects and creating an 
unpleasant emotion” (p. 261)? 
For answering such questions on the reality of atmospheres or on the universality of basic 
emotions, the Handbook provides inspiring, up-to-date and heterogeneous analytic tools. For 
studying religious dramaturgies, it is worthwhile to be aware of the “filtering mechanisms” 
(Mohr, p. 131) of attention, motivated by exogenous and endogenous stimuli, controlled in 
“hierarchies of media that are privileged, restricted, or even banned (such as dance)” (Borelli 
& Grieser, p. 41) and even becoming measurable in “somatic modes of attention” as “bio-
chemical processes” (Kreinath, p. 49). Dramaturgic means are not only directing ritual action, 
but also the narration of stories, which is also performative: it engages an audience by utilizing 
its scenery (for instance, a fire in the night).  
But not only the rituals, narrations and films analyzed, but also the study and didactics of 
religion employ dramatic means. Learning is long recognized to be more effective “if students 
are emotionally involved” (p. 286). Of course, such insights should be taken into account while 
Teaching Aesthetics of Religion (pp. 285-294). This final, collaborative chapter of the volume 
is very innovative and inspiring and as polyphonous as the volume as a whole. Among others 
learning targets, “intensive personal experiences” and “deep emotions” (p. 288) are mentioned 
– here, the question arises whether such goals are adequate for academic settings. Isn’t it too 
dangerous to play with such things? Teaching students of religions might even aim at guiding 
them to “cultivate inner self-awareness and outer compassion” (p. 287), to better perceive the 
own emotions, those of others, and social inequalities (p. 292) – however this might fit with the 
academic norms of non-normativity.  
G) The Wow 
Does the Handbook advance the “deconstruction of religion” (Introduction, p. 2)? It does, 
insofar as a critical reconsideration and re-sensualization of its alleged opposites, namely 
science and secularism, also helps to erase clichéd notions of “religion” itself. Especially the 
article of Stefan Binder on South Indian Secularism shatters what one might expect by pointing 
to various ironies of this movement. Its mythical narratives about an “atheist, materialist, 
rationalist, or proto-communist” Dravidian prehistory (p. 267), its rhetorically “fluent rejection 
of religious fluency” (270) and the ritualism of anti-ritualists are another instance of an 
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aesthetics of a seemingly anti-aesthetic movement (p. 264; cf. Yelle, pp. 241ff.). Moreover, in 
differing considerably from the more familiar progress-oriented or Communist narratives of 
secularism, this study exposes these as no less mythical than the religious narratives they 
oppose. Likewise, the reader learns to see in Neuroscience and its popularization an aesthetical 
dialectic of “a process of demystification of the brain, eliminating the soul through scientific 
research, and a process of re-mystification by aestheticizing the organ” (Borelli & Grieser, p. 
43). The authors draw connections between, on the one hand, religious iconographies of body 
parts “connected to the divine by means of sparks or beams”, and, on the other hand, scientific 
visualizations of “the brain”, whose “basic features are a characteristic neon-blue color, with 
sparks, beams, and an effect of glowing from within” (ibid.). 
Does the Handbook “open new ways of discovering formerly unnoticed qualities of religion” 
(Kreinath, p. 48)? Conceiving of imagination as the capability to abstract or decouple from 
perceived reality bears a huge innovative potential for any study of religious processes of “going 
beyond” (lat. transcendere) or “carrying something beyond” (old Gr. metaphorein) the familiar 
world and meanings. Such processes are constitutive for whatever is called “religion” or a 
religious “symbol”8. Thinking of religion as imagination, as well as foci on attention or non-
human personhood  – for instance, of spirits (Bräunlein, pp. 273-282) or of texts (Wilkens, p. 
155) – are all not quite new, but, in this volume, affirmed and revalued by interdisciplinary 
exchange with more experimentally oriented sciences.  
Not only that, the contributors to the Handbook discover these “religious” qualities even outside 
religion, as “enchanted matter” (Johnston, p. 190) in the art of Andy Goldsworthy, or as “trans-
corporeality” (Klassen, p. 172) in a not specifically religious comic. Here, sensual habits are 
transcended by means of the medium, when, for instance, a noise or a smell is drawn (p. 166), 
or by means of narrative and imagination, when the perception of the world as mediated by the 
comic goes beyond human sensuality and brings “the feeling of a plant – green, swampy, mucky 
– into our own embodiment” (p. 172). One is invited to think about “music as invisible religion” 
and provided with emic perspectives expressing this same view (Wilke, p. 116), or to regard a 
scientific urge “to find hidden symmetries in nature” (Borelli & Grieser, p. 40) as semi-
religious, rooted in “traditional aesthetic modes linking harmony, beauty, and the (hidden) 
divine” (ibid.). 
                                                          
8  According to Susanne Langer, a “symbol is any device whereby we are enabled to make an abstraction” 
(Langer, Susanne (1953): Feeling and Form. New York: Scribner, p. xi).  
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H) Politics 
Especially part III about aesthetic strategies makes it clear how inseparable aesthetics are from 
politics – and vice versa. Two images of a National Socialist cult location near Bückeburg – 
once in use during the Reichserntedankfest 1937 and once in a future plan of a subversive 
memorial – powerfully illustrate an article on “sensory strategies” like sensual enhancing and 
deprivation (Mohr, p. 131). The fascist ritual makes strategic use of sensational habits and 
dispositions to create conformity, even uniformity, of a human “mass”. Thus, it provides a 
strong example of how such dramaturgic means of “activating” and “filtering” sensations (ibid.) 
connect religious, political and hybrid performances. Provokingly, this enables a comparison 
between Nazi festivals, evangelical mega-churches and Spanish fire-walking events (p. 136). 
Such an examination of “the aesthetics of political regimes” (p. 265) in the tradition of the 
Frankfurt school is fruitful not only for social and political sciences, but also for the study of 
religion. In turn, an aesthetics of religion can enrich scholars’ engagement with the history of 
political ideas – the concept of “idea” itself pointing not only to abstract concepts, but to images 
and imaginations. Aesthetic approaches shed, for example, new light on who Indian Atheists 
are, if not “a ‘Westernized’ product of European colonialism” (Binder, p. 267). 
Studying the abovementioned performance of conformity as an aesthetic regime or ideology 
(Borelli & Grieser, p. 37 ff.) enhances the critical potential of an engaged study of religion, 
asking questions with a strong political resonance: 
“How in the context of religious practice are the senses stimulated, governed and 
disciplined? How are religious experiences, emotions and attitudes created, memorized 
and normalized? How do religious perceptual orders interact with those of a larger 
culture?”9 
Aesthetic regimes can take different forms and shapes and give different forms and shapes, for 
instance, to gender. As early as 1792, Mary Woolstonecraft observed how „the soft phrases, 
susceptibility of heart, delicacy of sentiment, and refinement of taste, are almost synonymous 
with epithets of weakness“10. Given this long history of analyzing how aesthetic ideologies 
control gender, one wonders why this handbook does not make more mention of these 
                                                          
9 Grieser, Alexandra; Johnston, Jay (2017): What is an Aesthetics of Religion? From the Senses to Meaning – 
and Back again. In: Grieser, Alexandra; Johnston, Jay (ed.): Aestetics of Religion. A Connective Concept. 
Berlin/Boston, pp. 1-49, p. 2. 
10 Woolstonecraft, Mary, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 1792, p. 6 
(https://books.google.de/books?id=qhcFAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA15&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q&f=
false). 
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discourses. There is only one entry on Gendered Performativity (pp. 175-183) by Shaireen 
Rasheed, who problematizes disembodied notions of agency and empowerment of women in 
“dichotomizing dominant/resistant discourses” (p. 181), which are unable to perceive how very 
empowered and active women can use their agency to “support a patriarchal and Islamic 
agenda” (182). However, it remains unclear what makes her approach “aesthetical”, and, thus, 
I feel quite uncomfortable about her suggestion that scholars of religion should “move away 
from a liberal, rights-based discourse to an aesthetics of religion framework” (p. 181). Words 
like “agency”, “creativity” and “empowerment” have too positive connotations to leave them 
uncommented, as Rasheed does, speaking about “creatively deployed violence” in 
“kidnappings and forcible closing of immoral businesses” and “the almost Maoist ‘re-
education’ and subsequent release of alleged prostitutes” (p. 180) – instances which I do not 
want to study outside a liberal, rights-based academic discourse. 
An Aesthetics of knowledge (pp. 33-46) also implies aesthetics of powe. This holds true, for 
example, when Native Australian “practices of land ownership” are based on “a thoroughly 
different aesthetic mode of mathematical knowledge” (p. 39). In this sense, Annette Wilke’s 
work on South Indian cultures of Sonality (pp. 107-116) is itself also highly political, leading 
her to conclude that “the term ‘Hinduism’, which has often been criticized as an orientalist and 
essentialist construction, can be retained” (p. 115).  
 
Recommendation 
The wide range of approaches gathered in this volume makes it indispensable for studying how 
exactly the much-evoked forces and agencies of sensuality, matter and affect actually affect 
bodies. It has been often and repeatedly claimed that objects have agency, that religion might 
be seen as a flow of affective powers through bodies (see, for instance, Donovan O. Schaefer’s 
book on Religious Affects) – but the question remains open what that would exactly mean. In 
all their polyphony and discontinuity, the contributions to this volume give much-needed 
answers to such questions, gained from philological and ethnographic as well as from 
neuroscientific studies. Filling a lot of gaps, many new questions rise, and the insights into the 
diverse methods and processes of data collection are useful for ongoing and upcoming studies 
within the still emerging field of the Aesthetics of Religion. 
